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Abstract 
A novel high-capacity and high-efficient deterministic secure quantum communication protocol with four-qubit W 
states is proposed. By utilizing four kinds of unitary operations, the two legitimate users can directly transmit the 
secret messages based on the Bell measurements and some additional classical information. Analysis shows that our 
protocol has a high capacity as each W state can carry two bits of secret information, and has a high intrinsic 
efficiency because almost all the instances are useful. Moreover, this protocol is unconditionally secure and feasible 
with present-day technique. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Harbin University 
of Science and Technology 
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1. Introduction 
The quantum key distribution (QKD) is an ingenious application of quantum mechanics, in which two 
remote legitimate users, say Alice and Bob, can establish a shared secret key through the transmission of 
quantum signals. Its ultimate advantage is the unconditional security, the feat in cryptography. Hence, 
after Bennett and Brassard’s pioneering work published in 1984, [1] much attention has been focused on 
QKD. [2-10] 
Another class of quantum communication used to transmit secret messages is called as deterministic 
secure quantum communication (DSQC). It is different from QSDC, and in DSQC the receiver can read 
out the secret message only after exchanging at least one bit of classical information from the sender for 
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each qubit. Since Beige et al. [11] put forward the pioneering work in 2002, DSQC has been actively 
pursued by some groups.[12-16] As a matter fact, these works can be divided into two categories: one 
utilizes the single photons [11, 15], another adopts the entangled state, such as the EPR pairs [12, 13], the 
GHZ states [14], W states [16], etc. Similar to QSDC, another class of quantum cryptography is called 
deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC).[17-21] In the framework of DSQC, the receiver 
can read out the secret message only after the transmission of at least one bit of additional classical 
information for each qubit, different from QSDC in which the secret message can be read out directly 
without exchanging any classical information. Comparing with QKD, DSQC can be used to obtain 
deterministic information, not a randomly binary string. So far, DSQC has been actively pursued by some 
groups.  
2. DSQC protocol with four-qubit W state 
Now, let us describe the details of our DSQC protocol. Here, we only consider the ideal condition, i.e., 
there is no noise and losses in the quantum channel. Suppose there are two legitimate anticipators, Alice 
and Bob. Alice is the sender, and Alice wants to transmit N two-bit secret classical message to Bob, 
which can be achieved with the following seven steps. 
• Step 1  Preparing a quartet sequence P 
Alice produces a sequence of N ordered quartets of entangled particles P. Each quartet is in the four-
qubit W state, which is defined as  
          
1 2 1 2A A B B4
1
W ( 0001 0010 0100 1000 )
2
= + + +
                                                                    (1) 
Where the subscript 1A , 2A , 1B  and 2B  represent the four particles of the 4W state. We denote the 
ordered n quartets in the sequence P with 1 1 2 1 2{ p ( A ,A ,B ,B ), 2 1 2 1 2p ( A ,A ,B ,B ) n 1 2 1 2...p ( A ,A ,B ,B )} where the 
subscripts 1,2,...,n indicate the order of each particle quartet in the sequence P, respectively. 
• Step 2  Encoding secret information on the sequence P
Alice performs one of the four unitary operations { 00 01 10 11U ,U ,U ,U } on the particles 2A  and 1B  of each 
quartet in the sequence P to encode her secret messages {00,01,10,11}, where 
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 100 A B 01 x A B 10 y A z B 11 z A z B
U I I ,U I ,U i ,Uσ σ σ σ σ= ⊗ = ⊗ = ⊗ = ⊗
                                                      (2) 
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The operation ijU  ( i, j {0,1}∈ ) will transform the state 4W into the state mnW , Where 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
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A A B BB B A A
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                                                                       (4) 
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= + + +
                                                                      (5) 
570  Guo ZHAO et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 568 – 572 Author name / Procedia Engineeri  00 (2011) 00 –000 3
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
10 A A B B
A A B BB B A A
1
W ( 0101 0110 0000 1100 )
2
1
[( ) ( ) ]
2
ψ ψ ψ φ φ φ+ − − − + −
= − − +
= + − +
                                                                      (6) 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
11 A A B B
A A B BB B A A
1
W ( 0001 0010 0100 1000 )
2
1
[( ) ( ) ]
2
φ φ ψ ψ φ φ+ − − − + −
= − − +
= + − +
                                                                       (7) 
Here φ± , ψ ± are the four Bell states, which are defined as the follows, 
                   
1 1
( 00 11 ), ( 01 10 )
2 2
φ ψ± ±= ± = ±
                                                                (8) 
• Step 3  Dividing the particles in the sequence. 
Alice takes the particles 1A and 2A from each quartet in the sequence P to form an ordered particle pair 
sequence 1 1 2 2 1 2 n 1 2{ p ( A ,A ), p ( A ,A ),..., p ( A ,A )} , named the Ap  sequence. The remaining partner particle 
pair 1 1 2 2 1 2 n 1 2{ p ( B ,B ), p ( B ,B ),..., p ( B ,B )}  is called the Bp  sequence. 
• Step 4  Preparing the checking single photons. 
Before sending the Bp  sequence to Bob, Alice has to add some decoy particles in it. The purpose of 
this step is to guard for eavesdropping in the transmission of the Bp sequence. Alice prepares the non-
orthogonal decoy particles each randomly in one of the four states { 0 , 1 , , }+ − , here 1 ( 0 1 )
2
± = ± .
Then she randomly inserts the decoy particles into the Bp  sequence. Thus, a new sequence 
'
Bp  is formed. 
Since the states and the positions of the decoy particles are only known for Alice herself, the 
eavesdropping done by an eavesdropper will inevitably disturb these decoy particles and will be detected. 
• Step 5  Transmitting the 'Bp  sequence. 
After Alice added decoy particles into the Bp  sequence, she sends the 
'
Bp  sequence to Bob, and keeps 
the Ap  sequence in her hand. 
• Step 6  Checking eavesdropping of the quantum channel. 
After confirming Bob has received the 'Bp sequence, Alice announces publicly the positions and the 
states of the decoy photons. Then Bob performs a suitable measurement on each decoy photon with the 
same basis as Alice chose for preparing it. By comparing his measurement results with Alice’s 
announcement, Bob can then evaluate the error rate of the transmission of the 'Bp  sequence. If the error 
rate exceeds the threshold, they abort this communication and repeat the procedures from the beginning. 
Otherwise, they continue to the next step. Alice exposes the secret transmitted order of the 'Bp  sequence. 
According to this information Bob can adjust the disturbed sequence 'Bp  to the original sequence Bp .
• Step 7  Decoding secret information 
Alice performs Bell measurements on her particle pairs (i.e., the particles 1A and 2A ) in the Ap
sequence. Bob performs Bell-basis measurements on the partner particle pairs (i.e., the particles 1B and 2B )
in the Bp  sequence, respectively. Subsequently, Alice publishes her measurement results of the 
particles 1A and 2A in the Ap  sequence. Thus Bob can obtain Alice’s secret message by comparing his 
measurement result with Alice’s measurement result according to Eqs. (4)~(7). Table 1 shows the joint 
correlations of the results for measurements made by Alice for particles 1A and 2A , Bob for particles 
1B and 2B  in all the possible cases of quantum communication in our DSQC protocol. 
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Table 1. Corresponding relations between Alice’s measurement results and Bob’s measurement results and the secret messages in 
the presented DSQC protocol. 
Alice’s measurements Bob’s measurement the secret messages
orφ φ+ − ψ + 00
orψ ψ+ − ψ + 01
orψ ψ+ − ψ − 10
or )φ φ+ − ψ − 11
ψ + orφ φ+ − 00
φ+ orφ φ+ − 01
φ− orφ φ+ − 10
ψ − orφ φ+ − 11
3. Security and Efficiency analysis 
Security is an important issue of quantum secure communication, especially to DSQC or QSDC 
protocol. To gain some useful information about the secret message, Eve must attack the quantum 
channel during the transmitting process. She may use some types of man-in-the-middle attack strategy, 
such as (1) Measure-resend attack: Eve measures the qubits emerging from Alice and then resends them 
to Bob. (2) Entangle-measure attack: Eve entangles her ancilla with the particle pair 
i 1 2p ( B ,B ) ( i {1,2,...,n }∈ ) before i 1 2p ( B ,B )  reaches Bob. After Bob measures his particle pair i 1 2p ( B ,B ) ,
Eve does so with her ancilla and deduce Bob’s measurement result. Unfortunately, all of the above types 
of attack can be forbidden by the decoy-particle checking procedure explained in the preceding section, 
The step 6, in our protocol, each decoy photon is prepared randomly in one of the four states 
{ 0 , 1 , , }+ − , and is distributed in the sequence Bp  randomly. That is to say, the states and the 
positions of the decoy photons are unknown for Eve. Hence, Once Eve manipulates the particle pairs in 
the sequence Bp , she will inevitably disturb these decoy photons and be easily detected by the authorized 
users. No one knows the positions and the states of the decoy particles except for Alice herself. Therefore, 
any eavesdropping done by Eve will inevitably disturb the states of the decoy particles and ultimately be 
detected by the two legitimate users Alice and Bob. That is to say, the states and the positions of the 
single-photon states are unknown for Eve. Hence, any eavesdropping done by Eve will inevitably disturb 
these particles and be detected by the legitimate users.  
Following, we investigate the intrinsic efficiency and the total efficiency of our DSQC protocol, 
respectively. The definition of intrinsic efficiency of a quantum communication scheme is [22] 
                             uq
t
q
q
η =                                                                                                                  (9) 
Where uq  is the number of useful qubits in the quantum communication and tq  is the number of total 
qubits used (not the ones transmitted). 
Next, we calculate the total efficiency of our DSQC protocol. Let’s employ the definition in Ref. [34] 
to the total efficiency of a quantum communication: 
s
t
t t
b
q b
η = +                                                                                                              (10) 
Where sb  and tb  are the numbers of message transmitted and the classical bits exchanged, respectively. 
In the present DSQC protocol, the legitimate communicators need two bits of classical information and 
four bits of quantum information to communicate two bits of secret message, that is, sb = 2, tq = 4 and 
tb = 2. Thus, it’s total efficiency is our tη = 2/(4+2) = 1/3=33.3% in theory. 
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4. Conclusion 
In summary, we have presented an efficient DSQC protocol based on the four-qubit W states and 
single-photon eavesdropping check. In this protocol, the two legitimate users exploit the four local unitary 
operations x y zI , ,i , ,δ δ δ to encode their secret messages, and then decode them by using Bell-basis 
measurements with help of classical information exchanging. Since the quantum carriers are transmitted 
only one time, the opportunity of Eve intercepts them is greatly reduced. The security of the present 
DSQC scheme is assured by utilizing the single-photon to check eavesdropping. Analysis shows it is 
secure and feasibility. It’s intrinsic efficiency for qubits and source capacity are both high as almost all of 
the instances are useful and each W state can carry two bits of information. The total efficiency of our 
protocol is 33.3%, which is higher than that of some existing DSQC protocols. Hence, our protocol is 
more efficient. Furthermore, since W state has been applied in one-way quantum computer, the 
communication of our protocol is easily implemented by this kind of quantum computer. 
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